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THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS.,
ROBERT RALSTON.

2

The work which has been done by the Institute in the past year
appears in the reports of the Committees, which will come up for
discussion this morning. I would suggest that the appropriate
Committee consider the advisability of framing a law to regulate the
sale of fire-arms in the different states. Many crimes are directly
due to the habit which is common among certain citizens and aliens of
carrying revolvers and other deadly weapons. Unless a uniform
law on this subject is passed by the various states, the traffic in
fire-armi cannot be regulated, because a person in a State where their
sale is prohibited can purchase weapons in an adjoining State. In
New York there is such a statute, but men cross the river to Jersey
City, buy their fire-arms, and return to New York. The Committee
of the Institute might co-operate with the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws for the purpose of drafting and securing the adoption of
such legislation.
In recent years probably no subject has been so much discussed
by speakers at meetings of Bar Associations and by writers in law
journals and other periodicals as the unsatisfactory administration
of the criminal law in the United States. Some years ago Mr. Taft
said: "It is not too much to say that the administration of the criminal law in this country is a disgrace to our civilization." This remark
has since been frequently quoted with approval. When the statement
was made Mr. Taft probably had in mind some of the notorious trials,
which if they represented the usual methods pursued in this country,
would fully justify the statement. It must be remembered, however,
that there are forty-eight states in the Union, and if he meant that in
each one of those states the administration of the criminal law is a
disgrace to our civilization, the statement was entirely too broad.
Indeed, if the conditions which he was referring to were carefully
investigated, I believe it would be found that the administration of
the criminal law is satisfactory in many of the states, and that it is
in comparatively few of them that such a condition as he described
1. Read at the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Institute at Salt Lake City.
2. Judge of the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia.
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exists. At least it is from comparatively few states that such complaints are heard.
Many criticisms of criminal procedure in the United States
have been made, and many remedies suggested. It must be borne
in mind that there is no one system of criminal procedure in this
country, but that the practice varies greatly in different states.
The matters which have been the principal subjects of criticism are the
following: The quashing of indictments or granting of new trials
on account of some disqualification of a grand juror, or some technical
error in the indictment or at the trial; the great length of time consumed
in selecting juries; the methods of examining expert witnesses; the
constitutional prohibition against compelling the accused to testify,
and the usual prohibition against commenting upon his failure to
testify; the abuse of their privileges by lawyers; the methods of the
judges in charging juries; the premature discharge of the jury before
they have agreed; delays by appeals and the taking of writs of habeas
corpus.

A number of writers and speakers, Mr. Taft among them, have
commended the English system of trials, and while some have criticised
the administration of the criminal law in England, none, so far as
I know, have found fault with the system itself. A few years ago a
Committee of the Institute investigated the method of procedure in
England, and the result of their labors will be found in their reports
which are published in the Journal of the Institute. In considering
the defects of the so-called American system, it may be useful to
point out the methods pursued in England, so that we may determine
whether fault is to be found with our system or the way in which it is
administered.
In some states theoevidence heard by the grand jury is stenographically reported, and all matters relating to the.formation of the grand
jury, and the state of mind of the grand jurors may be inquired into,
and if it is found that one of the grand jurors was in a state of mind
which disqualified him to act as a trial juror, the indictment will be set
aside. In England by the common law, a defendant had a right to
challenge the array of grand or petit jurors, and to challenge a grand
juror for cause, and I suppose this right still exists, although it is
seldom if ever exercised. In Pennsylvania a defendant may challenge
the array of grand or petit jurors, but must do so before he pleads.
It is provided by the Act of February 21, 1814 (6 Sm. L., 111) that
no verdict shall be set aside or judgment reversed for any defect in
the summoning or drawing of jurors, but a trial or a plea shall be a
waiver of all such errors and defects. If the defendant before pleading
shows good cause for quashing an array of petit jurors, the court has
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power to quash the array, issue a special venire and proceed with the
trial: (Comm. v. Shew, 8 Dist. Reps. 484). A challenge of a grand
juror for cause must be made before the indictment is found, and will
not be regarded as a sufficient reason to quash the indictment: (Rolland
v. Comm., 82 Pa., 306; Comm. v. Craig, 19 Pa. Sup. Ct., 81). Consequently, unless there is substantial reason for challenging the array
or a particular grand juror, the defendant has little to gain by doing so.
In the fourteen years that I have been on the bench I have never
known a challenge to be made to a grand juror or any question to be
raised on account of a defect in the summoning or empanelling of
the grand jury. Many writers are of opinion that proceedings
should be begun by information instead of indictment. An information filed after a defendant has had a preliminary hearing
before a magistrate and has been held for court would in ordinary
times probably not result in any injustice. The duties of a grand
jury consist in passing upon bills of indictment, many of which
it ignores because there is not sufficient evidence to warrant the
prosecution. It also visits the various institutions of the county and
since many grand jurors are summoned in the course of a year (there
being in Philadelphia a new grand jury each month), many citizens
are brought into contact with the courts and thereby, acquire more or
less knowledge of the practical administration of justice. There is
always a possibility that a situation may arise when a grand jury
would be most useful,and were it to be abolished there would be nothing
to take its place. For instance, if we imagine a prosecution against
persons powerful in the community, by reason of wealth or political
influence, it might be impossible to induce a district attorney friendly
to them to present an information against them, indeed there might
be no other way of bringing them to justice than by the finding of a
bill of indictment by a grand jury. On the other hand, if the same
powerful interests were desirous of prosecuting and ruining citizens
who had ventured to oppose them, a magistrate could be found who
would hold them for court, and the district attorney would present
informations against them which a grand jury, if they were presented
to them in the form of indictments, would ignore. I can see no great
advantage in doing away with the grand jury, and I can imagine
cases where it might be of the greatest value.
It is not unusual even at the present day to hear of a verdict
and judgment being set aside on account of some technical error in
the indictment, although admittedly the prisoner has had a' fair
trial, and has been convicted on evidence which leaves no doubt
whatever of his guilt. When we find a seeming absurdity in the
common law, if we look further into the matter we usually discover
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that it was not due to a lack of common sense on the part of the judges,
but that it was adopted for some purpose which seemed sufficient
at the time. The reasons for hair-splitting technicalities, in criminal
procedure arose from the humanity of the judges who were disposed
to hold the Crown to the strictest rules in order to avoid the punishment of death which followed almost every conviction of felony.
Thus, where the testimony showed that the prisoner aimed his gun
at a bird and fired, and the bird dropped, upon its being suggested
to the jury that no one saw the shot hit the bird, and that it might
have died of fright, the prisoner was acquitted. So, on a trial for
larceny, althought it appeared that the watch stolen was worth
many guineas, the judge instructed the jury to fix its value at less thafi
a shilling. Nothing could apparently be more absurd than these
rulings, and yet the judges who tried those cases were not fools;
they simply would not, if they could avoid it, send a man to his
death for killing a bird or stealing a watch. But the punishments
for crime have been ameliorated and technicalities have long since
served their purpose. Today lawyers and laymen are shocked
when they hear that an appellate court has set aside a conviction on
the ground that a meaningless word or even a letter has been omitted
from an indictment, or that the indictment is defective for some
other equally technical reason. Many instances of such reversals
may be found in numerous articles in the Journal of the Insitut.
I will mention only a few cases.
In Goodlove v. State, 92 N. E., 491 (1910), the indictment charged
the accused with having killed one "Percy Stuckey, alias Frank
McCormick;" the evidence showed that the defendant killed a person
commonly known as Frank McCormick, but it was not shown that the
Frank McCormick who was killed and Percy Stuckey were one and
the same person. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that this was a
fatal variance.
In Grantham v. State, 129 S. W., 839 (1910), the defendant was
charged with burglary of a certain house occupied by six persons
named in the indictment. The proof showed that the house was occupied by the first five persons named butnot by the sixth. The Court
of Criminal Appeals of Texas set the verdict aside on account of this
variance. The same Court set aside a trial because the indictment
concluded with the words "against peace and dignity of State."
omitting the word "the" which should have immediately preceded
the word "State:"
Thompson v. State, 15 Texas App., 39 (1883).
In State v. Campbell, 210 Missouri Reports, 202 (at page 226)
(1907), where there was a similar omission, the Supreme Court of
Missouri in a very long and learned opinion followed the ruling of the
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Texas Court and said: "It is not a satisfactory solution of this proposition to say we know what was intended or meant by the conclusion
in the case at bar, or that it was a mere matter of form. The proposition confronting us is not what the pleader meant to say, but
what did he say, and do the terms used in concluding the indictment
in this case substantially conform to the requirements prescribed
by the

Constitution?

*

*

*

In

our opinion the conclusion

prescribed by the Constitution of this State is not only one of form, but
as well one of substance."
In State v. Woodward, 191 Missouri, 617 (at page 630) (1905),
the Court said: "The charge in this information may thus be
briefly stated: 'That the defendant unlawfully, willfully, feloniously,
premeditatedly, on purpose and of his malice aforethought, did
strike and beat him, the said Ed. Pedigo, at and upon the right side
of the head of him, the said Ed. Pedigo, with the club aforesaid, and
inflicting and giving to him, the said Ed. Pedigo, in and on the right
side of the head of him, the said Ed. Pedigo, one mortal wound,' etc.
We might stop here to inquire with what instrument was the mortal
wound given. It correctly charges the manner of the assault by
striking and beating the said Ed. Pedigo at and upon the right side
of his head with the club aforesaid; then follows the charge, connected
by the conjunction 'and,' inflicting and giving to said Pedigo one
mortal wound. It'is left to conjecture under the form of this charge,
whether the mortal wound was inflicted and given by the club, or
vrhether, in addition to beating and striking him with the club aforesaid, he also, by some other means, inflicted and gave the mortal
wound. If we were permitted to indulge in presumptions, it might
be said that the infliction and giving of the mortal wound charged in
this information was the result of the use of the club in the manner
alleged, but under the well-settled rules of law in respect to pleading
,in criminal cases, this cannot be done." After further reasoning
of the same general character the Court concluded that the information
was fatally defective and the judgment was reversed.
These decisions were made notwithstanding the fact that a
statute of Missouri provides that no indictment shall be deemed
invalid, nor shall a trial or judgment be stayed or altered for any
defect or imperfection which did not tend to prejudice the rights of
the defendant upon the merits. In spite of a similar statute the
Supreme Court of California set aside a trial because the letter "n"
was omitted from the word "larceny" in an indictment, People v.
St. Clair, 55 Cal. 524; 56 Cal, 406 (1880), and in another case an
indictment charging that "Lee Look" had murdered "Lee Wing,"
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was held inlsufficient because it did not aver that Lee Wing was a
human being, People v. Lee Look, 137 Cal. 590 (1902).
By the common law in an indictment for murder it was necessary
to set forth particularly the manner of the killing and the means by
which it was effected. In Rex. v. Kelly, 1 Mood. C. Cas. 113 (1825),
the indictment charged that the prisoner struck the deceased with a
piece of brick. On the trial it appeared that he struck with his fist,
and that the deceased fell upon a piece of brick which caused his
death: Held, that the cause of death had not been correctly stated,
and the prisoner was discharged. In Rex. v. Martin, 5 C. & P., 128,
the indictment charged that the wound was inflicted by a blow with
a hammer, held in the prisoner's hand, and it appeared that the
injury might have resulted from a fall against the lock of a door:
Held, that if the death was occasioned by a fall against the lock of a
door produced by the act of the defendant, the indictment was not
sufficient. In Rex. v. Hughes, 5 C. & P., 126 (1832), the indictment
charged an attempt to murder by shooting with a pistol loaded
with a leaden bullet. No evidence was produced to actually prove
that the pistol was loaded with a leaden bullet: Held, that the
indictment was not sufficiently proved and the defendant was acquitted.
To remedy this condition of the law the Statute 14 and 15
Victoria, chap. 100 (Aug. 7, 1851), was passed, which recited as follows:
"Whereas offenders frequently escape conviction on their trials by
reason of the technical strictness of criminal proceedings in matters
not material to the merits of the case: And whereas such technical
strictness may safely be relaxed in many instances, so as to ensure the
punishment of the guilty, without depriving the accused of any just
means of defence: And whereas a failure of justice often takes
place on the trial of persons charged with felony and misdemeanor
by reason of variances between the statement in the indictment
on which the trial is had and the proof of names, dates, matters, and
circumstances therein mentioned, not material to the merits of the
case, and by the mis-statement whereof the person on trial cannot
have been prejudiced in his 'defence':"
It then enacted that the
court might amend such variances and that every objection to any
indictment for any formal defect apparent on its face should be taken
by demurrer or motion to quash before the jury was sworn and not
afterward.
In Pennsylvania the Commissioners to revise the Penal Code in
their Report said: "The history of criminal administration abounds
with instances in which the guilty have escaped by reason of the apparently unreasonable nicety required in indictments

*

*

*

The

496

ROBERT RALSTON

reason which led to the adoption of these technical niceties has ceased
and with the cessation of the reason the technicalities themselves
should be expunged from our system." The Act which they recommended was passed in 1860 and provided among other things, as follows: Every indictment shall be deemed and adjudged sufficient which
charges the crime substantially in the language of the act of assembly
prohibiting the crime, if such there be, or if at common law, so plainly
that the nature of the charge may be easily understood by the jury;
every objection to an indictment for any formal defect, apparent on
the face thereof, shall be taken by demurrer or motion to quash, before
the jury is sworn, and not afterward, and every court before whom any
such objection shall be taken for any formal defect may, if it be
thought necessary, cause the indictment to be forthwith amended;
if on the trial there shall appear to be a variance between the indictment and the proof, if the court shall consider such variance not
material to the merits of the case, it may order the indictment to be
amended; in any indictment for murder or manslaughter it shall not
be necessary to set forth the manner in which, or the means by which
the death of the deceased was caused, but it shall be sufficient in
every indictment for murder to charge that the defendant did feloniously, willfully, and of his malice aforethought, kill and murder the
deceased.
In Commonwealth v. Tassone, 246 Pa., 543, the indictment
charged that the crime was committed on October 31, 1914. On
April 27, 1914, six days after the prisoner had been convicted of
murder of the first degree, his counsel moved in arrest of judgment
on the ground that the indictment on 'vhich he had been found guilty
charged the offense as having been committed more than six months
after the trial. On May 20, 1914, on motion of the District Attorney
the Court permitted the indictment to be amended by changing the
date to October 31, 1913. The Supreme Court held that the amendment was proper.
These and other provisions of the Pennsylvania Act of 1860 are
substantially the same as those of the English Statute of 14 and 15
Victoria, chapter 100. Thus in England and Pennsylvania technical
objections to indictments were practically abolished. Since such
objections must be made before trial, and if sustained, result merely in
an amendment of the indictment, little or nothing is gained by raising
them.
One of our Committees has prepared an elaborate draft of a
statute upon this subject which was approved by the Institute at
its last meeting. This draft contains forty-one sections, and will
probably cover any questions which are likely to be raised. It also
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provides for simplicity in indictments. In my own opinion it does
not make much difference whether indictments are drawn in the quaint
language of long ago, or in concise and simple words, so long as they
clearly indicate what the charge against the defendant is. The real
remedy for the evil of technicalities will be found in statutes similar
to those of England and Pennsylvania, providing that all objections
to an indictment must be made before trial, and the indictment
amended, if the judge before whom the question is raised deems it
necessary. "It might also be a good idea to further provide that no
exception to, or appeal from, the ruling of the judge passing upon the
sufficiency of the indictment should be allowed. Such a statute
would be advisable because lawyers will not raise technical questions
if they know they can gain nothing by so doing, and when a judge
pronounces an indictment sufficient we may rest assured that if he
has made a technical mistake it is of such a character that it cannot
prejudice the defendant in the slightest degree; while on the other
hand, if he regards an indictment as technically defective he will
order it to be amended.
Judgments are also reversed for errors and omissions in the record,
which one would suppose might easily be corrected without sending
the case back for another trial. For example in Crain v. United States,
162 U. S., 625, the record set forth an indictment, the appearance of
the accused, the selection of a jury, a trial by the jury, and the finding
of their verdict, but did not show that the accused was ever formally
arraigned, or that he pleaded to the indictment. The Supreme
Court of the United States set the conviction aside in a very long and
elaborate opinion in which it cited a number of early English authorities
on the importance of arraigning the prisoner, and his pleading, and
wound up by saying: "It were better that he should escape altogether
than that the court should sustain a judgment of conviction of an
infamous crime where the record does not clearly show that there
was a valid trial."
The importance of an arraignment in early days was owing to the
fact that when trial by jury was beginning to supersede the more
ancient trial by ordeal, the judges were not sure that they had the
right to try a man by a jury unless he consented to it; consequently
a prisoner having pleaded not guilty was always asked how he would
be tried, to which he replied "By God and by my country," a form
which is observed to this day in Pennsylvania. As a prisoner could
not be tried unless he "put himself upon the country," as it was
called, it followed that if he remained mute or refused to plead, he
could not be convicted, and consequently his estates could not be
forfeited to the Crown. Some prisoners tried the experiment of not
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pleading and in consequence a Statute was passed in 1275 which
provided that when a person refused to plead, he should be sent to
the prison "forte et dure," which meant that he should be imprisoned
until he starved to death. This was subsequently transformed into
the "peine forte et dure" by which if a man refused to plead he was
laid upon his back and a weight of iron set upon- his body as great as
he could bear, and-greater, and he was given only bread and water
on alternate days until he died.
In 1658 Major Strangeways refused to plead and made no
secret of the reason, namely, that his lands would be preserved
for his heirs. A portion of the mass of iron and stone laid upon him
was placed anglewise over his heart, and when it was discovered that
the weight was insufficient to crush the life out of him, the attendants
added the weight of their own bodies. This scene lasted eight or
ten minutes. When it was over the bruised and mangled body was
exposed to the public gaze. (Pike, History of Crime, Vol. II, 194, 195.)
This punishment was abolished by statute, 12 George III, chap. 20
(1772). In Pennsyvlania the Act of 1791 provides that when persons
refuse to plead, a plea of "not guilty" shall be entered upon the
record, and I presume the law in other states is the same. Consequently where a trial has taken place, and the defendant has been
fairly convicted, his interests cannot be prejudiced by amending
the record so as to state that he pleaded "not guilty," whether in
fact he did so or not, since if he had not pleaded the trial court would
have entered that plea for him.
No doubt such decisions as those mentioned have done much
to bring the administration of the criminal law into disrepute, and the
members of the Institute ought to do all in their power to procure the
passage of legislation in states where it is necessary which will effectively do away with such technicalities.
On the very threshold of the trial we are met with the serious
criticism that too much time is consumed in selecting a jury. In the.
cases of Neil Brown, Gilhooley and Shea, tried in Chicago, it took
three, nine and a half, and thirteen and a half weeks, respectively,
to select a jury. In the case of Calhoun in California, it took ninetyone days, and other instances of similar delays might readily be
mentioned.

(JOURNAL, Vol. I, 531.)

To remedy this evil it has been

suggested that counsel be required to finish the examination of a
juror within a certain number of minutes--say five-and that they
shall ask only certain questions. This would probably not be a
practical or satisfactory solution of the difficulty. Indeed the matter
is one which it will be very difficult to regulate by statute. In England
the prisoner has the right of challenge, but it is rarely exercised.
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In Pennsylvania a juror is seldom challenged except in trials for murder,
in which the Commonwealth and the prisoner are each allowed
twenty peremptory challenges. The jurors are usually examined on
their voir dire to discover if there is good cause for challenge; for instance, the counsel for the Commonwealth inquires whether or not
the juror has conscientious scruples against capital punishment
which would prevent his rendering a verdict of murder in the first
degree, whether he knows the prisoner or any of his family, and similar
questions. Counsel for the prisoner asks whether or not the juror
has read or heard about the case, and has formed an opinion. If the
juror says he has an opinion which, however, he can disregard, and try
the case on the evidence alone, his opinion is no ground for challenge.
In some states such an opinion is held to be good cause for challenge.
In Pennsylvania it seldom takes more than a few hours, rarely more
than a day, to select a jury in a murder case. The great length
of time consumed in some trials is due to the latitude in asking questions allowed counsel. The examination and cross-examination of
jurors should be controlled by the trial judge in the exercise of his
discretion, and his rulings should not be reversed on appeal except
for manifest error in overruling a challenge for cause by the prisoner.
Unless the trial judge has this power and exercises it firmly, the delay
in the selection of juries is likely to continue to be a blot upon the
administration of justice.
Another cause of criticism is the manner of examining expert
witnesses. the hypothetical question, taking hours or days to read,
is sheer nonsense, and should not be permitted by the trial judge, who
should control the examination of the witnesses, and see that it is
conducted reasonably and sensibly. Where an expert witness has
been present throughout the trial, and has heard all the testimony,
he can be asked his opinion of the prisoner's mental condition, assuming the testimony to be true. Where insanity is set up as a defense,
much difficulty would be avoided if the trial judge would bear in
mind that after all the question to be decided is not whether the
prisoner is insane from a medical point of view, but whether he is
responsible according to legal standards. A man may be insane in the
opinion of the doctors, and yet, if he knew what he was doing, and its
consequences, and that his act was punishable by law, he is responsible
whether he is insane or not. Some persons have even gone so far as
to urge that the defense of insanity be abolished, because, they say,
an insane man who has committed a murder is likely to do it again
if he has a chance, and for the protection of society he should be executed or imprisoned for life. Some writers have suggested that
nstead of the verdict usual in this country of "not guilty, on the
i
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ground of insanity," it would be better to substitute the English
verdict "guilty but insane," and thereby avoid the scandals which
have been brought about by prisoners who have been acquitted on the
ground of insanity constantly taking out writs of habeas corpus,
claiming that they have been restored to reason.
Very valuable work upon the important subject of insanity and
responsibility for crime has been done by a Committee of the Institute,
and a statute has been drafted embodying its ideas and recommendations.
Some critics would do away with the iminunity from testifying
which the accused now enjoys under the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitutions of the different states; others would not
go so far as this, but would permit the prosecuting attorney to comment upon the prisoner's failure to testify and ask the jury to draw
inferences 6f guilt therefrom. An amendment to the Constitution
of Ohio adopted September 3, 1912, provides that the failure of the
accused to testify may be considered by the Court and jury and may
be made the subject of comment by counsel. (JouizNAL, Vol. III, 925.)
We cannot compel the accused to give evidence against himself
without fundamentally changing our whole system of criminal
procedure. In all likelihood the people of this country are not yet
prepared to give up the present system and adopt that of the
continental countries.
In order to attain speedy and certain
justice it is not necessary to abandon the principle that the commonwealth must prove the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
that is, such a doubt as makes a juror conscientiously hesitate to
pronounce him guilty. If the evidence of the prosecution proves
that the prisoner is guilty it is not necessary to comment on his
failure to testify; if it does not prove it no comment can supply the
deficiency. If jurors choose to draw an inference of guilt from a
failure to testify there is nothing to prevent their doing so, and it is
probable that it always produces an unfavorable impression upon them
since every juryman must wonder why the prisoner does not avail
himself of the opportunity to deny the accusations against him.
From my own experience I am of opinion that no comment upon the
prisoner's failure to testify and no allusion thereto by counsel or the
court should be permitted. I- think it is better that the prisoner
should be convicted on evidence and not on inference.
Such
comment is not permitted in England.
Sometimes in criminal trials a great deal of time is wasted by
reason of the methods employed by counsel. Lawyers occasionally
wander far from the issue in cross-examining witnesses, make long
speeches in arguing upon the admission or rejection of testimony,
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make objectionable and improper statements to the jury and enter
into verbal tilts with their opponents. These are matters which
cannot be corrected by legislation. They do not occur in English
trials for two reasons: first, because the judge would not permit it,
and second, because such conduct would subject the barrister to
the criticism and disapproval of the bar. In England and in Pennsylvania where the English system has always prevailed, the trial judge
has ample power to keep the examination and cross-examination of
witnesses within proper bounds, and to compel lawyers to observe
the amenities of the profession. There are a few reported decisions
in which new trials have been granted on account of the remarks of
an over-zealous district attorney, but such instances are rare. The
members of the bar can be trusted to observe the traditions of the
profession, and if in the excitement of a trial they momentarily forget
themselves a word from the judge is usually sufficient to produce the
desired result; if it does not, he has power to commit them for contempt, or to suspend them from practice or even to disbar them.
Probably no legislation that has been passed has done more to
bring discredit upon criminal trials than those statutes which have
restricted the powers of the trial judge in charging the jury. In
some states he is not permitted to comment on the testimony, in others
he must reduce his charge to writing and give it to counsel before they
begin their arguments, in others counsel may write out a charge,
and if it is correct in' law, the judge must read it to the jury. So also
the practice very generally prevails of submitting a great many points
to the trial judge which he must affirm and read to the jury or refuse.
In some states points are handed up by both sides, in Pennsylvania
they are submitted by the prisoner's counsel only. These points
often contain statements of the law which are obviously correct,
and which the trial judge has fully covered in his charge. They also
frequently consist of long quotations from Supreme Court opinions,
and sometimes are framed very adroitly, not for the purpose of instructing the jury, but with the expectation that they will be overruled by the trial judge and furnish a ground for reversal in the appellate court. After concluding his charge to the jury, one of our distinguished judges said: "I now have rather a difficult duty to perform. Thirty-three points have been presented to me, containing
a statement of the law of murder in a great variety of forms, almost
like the shifting of the kaleidoscope which, though the beads are the
same, at each turn, presents a different aspect, and where it is rather
difficult to know precisely or to recollect what the impression is."
(Judge Hare in Commonwealth v. McManus, 28 W. N. C. 504). When
the trial judge does read the points it is safe to say that the ma-
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jority of the jurors do not understand them. I venture to assert
that if the jury were composed of twelve members of the bar, even
of lawyers familiar with criminal practice, they would not be able to
cofnprehend the subtle distinctions between the different points, and
would not understand their application to the facts of the case. In
short, such points are mere traps to catch the trial judge in error.
Nothing can be more absurd than to grant a new trial because of the
refusal of a point when the trial judge has said in his charge everything
that is necessary and proper to be said. In my opinion no exception
to or appeal from the refusal of a trial judge to affirm a point should be
permitted. If the charge is correct and fully covers the case, it is
sufficient; if it is incorrect, or if material matters which it should
contain have been omitted, it should be reversed. As it is, judges in
delivering their charges, not infrequently seem -to have the Supreme
Court more in mind than the jury, and charge for the purpose of
being affirmed, without much regard to whether or not they convey
to the jury a clear understanding of the law. A charge may be
absolutely correct in point of law, and yet impart little, if any real
information to a jury. In England, the trial judge not only states the
law, but also reviews the evidence and sometimes expresses his opinion
of its effect. In Pennsylvania the system is the same; there are no
statutes restraining or controlling the actions of the trial judge; it
is his duty tosum up the evidence on both sides fairly and impartially,
commenting upon its strong and weak points, pointing out the reasons
which witnesses may have for telling what is false, and comparing
their opportunities for observation. He frequently instructs the jury
to acquit a defendant, and does not hesitate to express an opinion
upon the facts if in his judgment the case requires it. In Commonwealth v. Orr, 138 Pa., 283, the Supreme Court in considering a charge
said: "We find in some instances the expression of a decided opinion
upon- the facts, but in no case was there an interference with the
province of the jury. We have said in repeated instances that it
is not error for a judge to express his opinion upon the facts if done
fairly; nay more, that it may be his duty to do so in some cases,
provided he does not give a binding direction or interfere with the
power of the jury." In, Commonwealth v. VanHorn, 188 Pa., 164,
the same Court said: "That a trial judge should abstain from
comments on the testimony in such a case as this, could not possibly
be expected. It would be a violation of his plain duty if he did."
A judge should sum up in simple colloquial language and apply the
law to the facts so that the jury can understand 'him. In a civil
action to recover for negligence a judge will often say: "If you find
that the plaintiff attempted to get off the car while it was in motion,
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he cannot recover." That conveys a more definite idea to the mind
of a juryman than if he should say: "If the plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence he cannot recover." So in a trial for murder
the jury can better understand a trial judge who says: "If you find
that the prisoner shot the deceased in the manner described by the
witnesses, he is guilty of murder" than if he were to tell them that
murder is the unlawful killing of another with malice aforethought.
The duties of a trial judge are well stated by Baron Bramwell,
who, in his examination before the Homicide Law Amendment Committee, upon being asked if he did not think the definitions in the Act
under consideration were confusing, said:
"I think a judge who knows his business never troubles the jury
with needless definitions, but he deals with the particular case before
him, and says, for instance, in the case which I have put: 'The first
question that you have to consider is: (forgive a sort of model
summing up), did the man die of the injuries which he received?
The doctors prove he did. The next question is, did the prisoner
commit them? As to which the evidence is so and so. Now you have
to consider, if you are of opinion that he is, at least, guilty of having
killed him, whether it is murder; and that depends upon the extent
of the blowA, and the place they were directed to. If you think he
intended to kill him, and did, it matters not what means he used;
but suppose he did not intend it, you must consider whether the means
used were likely to do it.'
If you observe, in that case you lay down
no definition; you assume that the jury and you both know what the
law is; or you tell them what the law is in that particular case. I
frankly confess that if I had to give to the jury a definition, 'First of
all, gentlemen, I have to tell you what homicide is, and then what
criminal homicide is, and then what is not criminal homicide,' I
expect the jury would be utterly bewildered. It is my duty, as a
judge, to inform myself of the meaning of the Act, and not to trouble
the jury with a definition, except so far as necessary."
Under the system which has been developed in England in the
course of hundreds of years, and has always been the practice in
Pennsylvania, a trial is not by jury and lawyers, in which the judge
is a mere bump on a log, as he has been described to be, with no more
power than a moderator of a religious assembly, but it is a trial by
judge and jury, in which the judge is an important and powerful
factor. I do not believe it is possible for a jury to acquire the same
understanding of a case from written instructions that they get from
an oral charge. It seems to me that it would be wise to restore to
the judges the power that has been taken from them by statute. It
might also be advisable to impress upon trial judges the idea that the
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purpose of the charge is to give actual instruction to the jury and
not merely to make a statement of the law which will stand the
scrutiny of the appellate court. I think it will be found that those
states in which the powers of the trial judge have been curtailed
are the ones in which there exists the greatest dissatisfaction with
the administration of the criminal law.
Some persons advocate a verdict by a majority or three-quarters
vote of the jury, except in murder cases. My experience has not
indicated that such a change is necessary, or that it would be an improvement. Jurors seem generally to agree in cases where they ought
to convict. In some states a jury is discharged if they do not reach
an agreement within twenty-four hours. In trials for homicide,
especially where the case has been exploited in the newspapers,
jurors will stand out and not come to an agreement if they know that
they will be discharged in a comparatively short time. In Pennsylvania the jurors are kept together until they agree, and are not discharged until it-is evident that an agreement is impossible. If
they are discharged the prisoner cannot be tried again.
One great source of delay, and one which can be remedied by
legislation, is the time consumed by appeals. In many states appeals
are permitted at any time within three or six months or *evenlonger.
If an appeal is to be taken, there is no reason why it should not be
perfected within ten days after sentence is pronounced. A simple
form of notice of appeal should be adopted instead of the issuance
by the Appellate Court of writs of error or certiorari, commanding
the court below to send up the record. Formal bills of exception
should be abolished. The English Court of Criminal Appeal, established in 1907, is composed of the Lord Chief Justice, and all the
judges of the King's Bench Division, of whom three constitute a
quorum. The decisions of this court are rendered promptly, and the
cases are finally disposed of long before an appeal would be even
begun in this country. It will be observed thatIthe court is composed
of judges of the King's Bench Division who attend to the business of
the Court of Criminal Appeal in addition to their other work. If
our Appellate Courts would hear criminal appeals separate from
civil appeals, or delegate, say three of their number to hear them,
and decide them before taking up civil business, the judges could
for the time being give their entire attention to criminal cases, and
doubtless dispose of them promptly. The printing of the record
and the testimony might be dispensed with. It is no doubt a convenience to have everything in print, but the practice entails great
expense and delay, and much is printed which is never looked at by
the judges of the Appellate Court. A great deal of time and expense
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would be saved, and appeals simplified, if the original record and
typewritten copy of the testimony and charge of the Court were
handed in to the Appellate Court. The trial judge always has a
copy of the testimony and charge which might be -sent with the
official copy, and after the argument, the District Attorney could
lend his copy to the Court. There is altogether too much formality
and delay in the taking of appeals, and the whole practice should be
greatly simplified.
It seems impossible to cure by statute the evil of having cases
reversed for technical or immaterial errors. Such decisions are common in states where acts have been passed providing that no case
shall be reversed unless the errdr complained of has prejudiced the
substantial rights of the defendant. The courts have regarded every
error as material, and consequently the statutes have had little
effect. As I have said before, in my opinion, no appeal should be
allowed from the decision of a judge refusing to quash an indictment.
After a case has gone through the almost interminable delays
in the courts, it is by no means ended. Applications for pardon
have become as much a part of routine procedure as appeals to the
Supreme Court. Those whose duty it is to fix a day for execution
often postpone it for a long time, and those who exercise the pardoning power frequently grant reprieves and put it off still further.
In some states the governor can pardon only upon the recommendation of a board of pardons, but these boards fall into the habit of
passing upon the propriety of the conviction instead of exercising
their proper function of granting clemency, and interminable delay
and uncertainty in the execution of the sentence of the court result
from the unauthorized assumption of judicial powers. If a man is
to be hung or electrocuted, it is better that it should be done promptly,
not only on account of its effect upon the community, but also because
it is more humane. It seems cold-blooded and cruel to keep a man
in prison for two or three years, and then, after he has adjusted his
life to his new surroundings, put him to death. It would be better
on all accounts to execute him a short time after conviction, if he is
to be executed at all. Great scandals have resulted from an abuse
of the pardoning power, and it is difficult to see how they can be
prevented by legislation.
Many of the matters which I have mentioned are under consideration by Committtees of the Institute. It must be borne in mind,
that while much can be accomplished by legislation, nevertheless no
statute can be devised by which a criminal trial can be conducted
automatically. No substitute can be found to take the place of the
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learning and training of the Bar and Bench, influenced and guided by
the honorable traditions of the profession.
The Institute has done most valuable work. Its Committees
are studying and investigating the causes of crime, the methods
by which it may be prevented or reduced, reforms in criminal procedure, the treatment of criminals, and many other kindred subjects,
and the results of their labors are presented to the Institute in the
form of drafts of statutes prepared with great care after mature confideration and reflection. Members are kept fully informed upon
shese subjects by the JOURNAL, the official publication" of the Institute, which publishes the latest decisions of the courts, reviews of
turrent literature, and by discussion and criticism arouses and maincains an interest in these subjects and exerts a great educational
tnfluence.

